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Truth and truthfulness in the sociology of educational knowledge
The aim of this article is to reflect on and explore questions of truth and objectivity in the sociology of educational knowledge. It begins by reviewing the problems raised by the social constructivist approaches to knowledge associated with the `new sociology of education' of the I970s. It su...
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Published in: | Theory and research in education 2007-07, Vol.5 (2), p.173-201 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | The aim of this article is to reflect on and explore questions of truth and
objectivity in the sociology of educational knowledge. It begins by reviewing the
problems raised by the social constructivist approaches to knowledge associated with
the `new sociology of education' of the I970s. It suggests that they have
significant parallels with the pragmatist ideas of James and Dewey that Durkheim
analysed so perceptively in his lectures on pragmatism. The article then considers
Basil Bernstein$quoteright$s development of Durkheim$quoteright$s ideas.We argue
that despite his highly original conceptual advances Bernstein seems to accept, at
least implicitly, that the natural sciences remain the only model for objective
knowledge. This leads us to a discussion of Ernest Cassirer$quoteright$s idea of
symbolic forms as a more adequate basis for the sociology of knowledge. In the
conclusion, the article suggests how an approach to knowledge in educational studies
that draws on Cassirer$quoteright$s idea of$space$quoteleftsymbolic objectivity' can
come to terms with the tension between the concept of truth and a commitment to
`being truthful' that was left unresolved, even unaddressed, by the
$space$quoteleftnew' sociology of education of the I970s. |
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ISSN: | 1477-8785 1741-3192 |
DOI: | 10.1177/1477878507077732 |