Agenda power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000

We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final-passage votes. Second, af...

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Published in:Legislative studies quarterly 2008-05, Vol.XXXIII (2), p.171-198
Main Authors: Cox, Gary W, Heller, William B, McCubbins, Mathew D
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agenda setting
Government coalitions
Italy
Legislative behaviour
Lower chamber
Political opposition
Political power
Roll-call voting
Ruling parties
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container_title Legislative studies quarterly
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creator Cox, Gary W
Heller, William B
McCubbins, Mathew D
description We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final-passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills-results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case. Reprinted by permission of the Comparative Legislative Research Center, University of Iowa
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Wiley; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection
subjects Agenda setting
Government coalitions
Italy
Legislative behaviour
Lower chamber
Political opposition
Political power
Roll-call voting
Ruling parties
title Agenda power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000
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