Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association 2008-03, Vol.11 (1), p.1-24
Main Authors: Cox, James C., Sadiraj, Klarita, Sadiraj, Vjollca
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
American dollar
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Design
Economic behaviour
Economic models
Economic psychology
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Endowment
Experimental economics
Experiments
Fear
Game Theory
Games
Hypothesis testing
Impact analysis
Methodology
Microeconomics
Moonlighting
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Parsimony
Reciprocity
Social and Behav. Sciences
Studies
Theory
Trust
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Summary:This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play.
ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-006-9156-7