Coalition formation in games without side payments

We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability à la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295–1313] into the classical Shapley λ -transfer value. Our analysis starts by first...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Mathematical social sciences 2008-11, Vol.56 (3), p.314-320
Main Authors: Centrone, F., Meo, C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Coalition structures
Coalitions
Cooperation
Cooperative games
Cooperative games Coalition structures Stability
Game theory
Payments
Stability
Structural analysis
Value
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Summary:We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability à la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295–1313] into the classical Shapley λ -transfer value. Our analysis starts by first defining a new solution concept, the λ -transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.
ISSN:0165-4896
1879-3118
DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.007