Are Disloyal Congressional Cartels Rewarded by Party Leadership?

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Atlantic economic journal 2008-03, Vol.36 (1), p.123-124
Main Authors: King, Ernest W., Mixon, Franklin G.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anthology
Cartels
Congressional committees
D00
D70
Economics
Economics and Finance
Elections
Endorsements
Hypotheses
Ideology
Influence
International Economics
Leadership
Legislators
Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics
Microeconomics
Policy analysis
Political aspects
Political economy
Political leadership
Public Finance
U.S.A
Voting behaviour
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
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ISSN:0197-4254
1573-9678
DOI:10.1007/s11293-007-9102-x