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Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics

Commentators and policymakers have articulated growing concerns about U.S. dependence on China and other authoritarian capitalist states as a source of credit to fund the United States' trade and budget deficits. What are the security implications of China's creditor status? If Beijing or...

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Published in:International security 2009-10, Vol.34 (2), p.7-45
Main Author: Drezner, Daniel W.
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Language:English
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description Commentators and policymakers have articulated growing concerns about U.S. dependence on China and other authoritarian capitalist states as a source of credit to fund the United States' trade and budget deficits. What are the security implications of China's creditor status? If Beijing or another sovereign creditor were to flex its financial muscles, would Washington buckle? The answer can be drawn from the existing literature on economic statecraft. An appraisal of the ability of creditor states to convert their financial power into political power suggests that the power of credit has been moderately exaggerated in policy circles. To use the argot of security studies, China's financial power increases its deterrent capabilities, but it has little effect on its compellence capabilities. China can use its financial power to resist U.S. entreaties, but it cannot coerce the United States into changing its policies. Financial power works best when a concert of creditors (or debtors) can be maintained. Two case studies—the contestation over regulating sovereign wealth funds and the protection of Chinese financial investments in the United States—demonstrate the constraints on China's financial power.
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Project Muse:Jisc Collections:Project MUSE Journals Agreement 2024:Premium Collection; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; MIT Press; JSTOR Archival Journals
subjects Balance of power
Budget deficits
Capital investments
China
China (People's Republic)
Chinese Challenges: Myth and Reality
Credit control
Creditors
Currency
Debt
Debtors
Debts
Dependency Theory
Economic power
Economic relations
Financial investments
Financial leverage
Foreign investment
Foreign investments
Foreign Policy
Foreign relations
Geopolitics
International economics
International finance
International financial institutions
International investment
International relations
National Security
Peoples Republic of China
Policy making
Political influences
Political Power
Sovereign wealth funds
U.S.A
United States
United States of America
World Economy
title Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics
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