Simple complexity from imitation games

We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2010-03, Vol.68 (2), p.683-688
Main Authors: McLennan, Andrew, Tourky, Rabee
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency
Complexity
Complexity theory
Game theory
Imitation games
Imitation games Symmetric games Symmetric Nash equilibria Quadratic programming Stationary points Complexity NASH
NASH
Nash equilibrium
Quadratic programming
Stationarity
Stationary points
Strategic behaviour
Studies
Symmetric games
Symmetric Nash equilibria
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Summary:We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to play the same pure strategy as the first player.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.003