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Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America

A comment on Professor Lucian Bebchuk's typically thoughtful article, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, is presented. In that article, Bebchuk sets out a reform proposal designed to meet some of the objections of skeptics who doubt the desirability of increasing shareholder power to in...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Harvard law review 2006-04, Vol.119 (6), p.1759-1783
Main Author: Strine, Leo E.
Format: Article
Language:English
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Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:A comment on Professor Lucian Bebchuk's typically thoughtful article, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, is presented. In that article, Bebchuk sets out a reform proposal designed to meet some of the objections of skeptics who doubt the desirability of increasing shareholder power to influence corporate decisionmaking. This essay proceeds in four steps. Initially, I summarize Bebchuk's policy proposal. Then, I describe in colloquial terms the perspective many traditionalist investors have about corporate governance. From there, I identify why Bebchuk's policy proposal likely would not find favor with such investors. Finally, I set forth, for illustrative purposes, the type of proposal to increase stockholder clout that might serve as the basis for a responsible reform that would address the legitimate concerns of traditionalists. This proposal would periodically bolster the ability of stockholders to run a competing slate of directors against an incumbent board they believe is performing poorly.
ISSN:0017-811X
2161-976X