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Optimal institutional mechanisms for funding generic advertising: an experimental analysis

Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated that could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect vo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of agricultural economics 2005-11, Vol.87 (4), p.1046-1060
Main Authors: Messer, Kent D., Schmit, Todd M., Kaiser, Harry M.
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated that could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect voluntary producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggest that producer referenda play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a provision point mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness.
ISSN:0002-9092
1467-8276
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00787.x