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Optimal institutional mechanisms for funding generic advertising: an experimental analysis
Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated that could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect vo...
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Published in: | American journal of agricultural economics 2005-11, Vol.87 (4), p.1046-1060 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated that could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect voluntary producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggest that producer referenda play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a provision point mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness. |
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ISSN: | 0002-9092 1467-8276 |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00787.x |