Interregional transfers: A political-economy CGE approach

. We model the effects of changes in a federal government's inter‐regional transfers within the context of a CGE model of a federal system in which regional governments act to maximise the welfare of the residents of their region subject to the effects of their decision on regional economic out...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Papers in regional science 2003-10, Vol.82 (4), p.535-554
Main Authors: Groenewold, Nicolaas, Hagger, Alfred J., Madden, John R.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Australia
Bgi / Prodig
C72
computable general equilibrium analysis
Consumption
D58
Decision making
Equilibrium
Federal government
Federal states
Federalism
Fiscal federalism
H73
Households
Human geography
Intergovernmentalism
interregional migration
Interregional transfers
Migration
Modelling
Per capita
Political and economic geography
Political economy
Politics
R13
R23
Regional economy and planning
Regional government
Regional studies
Simulation
Tariffs
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:. We model the effects of changes in a federal government's inter‐regional transfers within the context of a CGE model of a federal system in which regional governments act to maximise the welfare of the residents of their region subject to the effects of their decision on regional economic outcomes. Regional governments are modelled as players in a non‐cooperative game. Simulations are conducted with six versions of a small two‐region model, each calibrated for a particular Australian state and the rest of the nation. We show that a change in the level of transfers has little influence on per‐capita private consumption, government consumption and welfare, and that its main effect is to induce migration from the donor region to the recipient region.
ISSN:1056-8190
1435-5957
DOI:10.1007/s10110-003-0191-x