Competitive envy-free division

We are concerned with a fair division problem in which the indivisible "goods" to be distributed among a finite number of individuals have divisible "bads" associated with them. The problem is formulated and analyzed in terms of the housemates problem. We present an efficient pro...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2004-08, Vol.23 (1), p.103-111
Main Authors: Sung, Shao Chin, Vlach, Milan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Distribution economics
Households
Mathematical procedures
Optimal solutions
Ordered pairs
Public choice
Rent
Resource allocation
Rooms
Welfare economics
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Summary:We are concerned with a fair division problem in which the indivisible "goods" to be distributed among a finite number of individuals have divisible "bads" associated with them. The problem is formulated and analyzed in terms of the housemates problem. We present an efficient procedure that decides whether an envy-free solution exists, and if so, finds one of them; otherwise finds a solution such that each envious housemate is assigned a room whose rent is zero.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-003-0240-z