Legislative Organization

With an emphasis on the U.S. Congress, this essay addresses political economy approaches to the study of legislative organization. Simple models provide a foundation for more sophisticated studies of one of two problems: how coalitions of intense minorities pass policies that reflect gains from trad...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of economic perspectives 2004-01, Vol.18 (1), p.113-128
Main Author: Krehbiel, Keith
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Committees
Decision making
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Equal rights
Legislators
Legislature
Legislatures
Median voter model
Organization
Plurality voting
Policy making
Political economy
Political parties
Political science
Politics
Preferences
Public policy
Specialization
Standing committees
Studies
Symposium: Political Economy
Voters
Voting
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Summary:With an emphasis on the U.S. Congress, this essay addresses political economy approaches to the study of legislative organization. Simple models provide a foundation for more sophisticated studies of one of two problems: how coalitions of intense minorities pass policies that reflect gains from trade (efficiency in distributive policies) and how the legislature obtains gains from specialization (efficiency in information acquisition and dissemination). The recurring impediment to solutions to these problems is that legislatures are self-organizing and, therefore, have difficulty in committing to potentially effective institutional solutions.
ISSN:0895-3309
1944-7965
DOI:10.1257/089533004773563467