Discussion Note: Making Sense of Understanding

J.D. Trout (2002) presents a challenge to all theorists of scientific explanation who appeal to the notion of understanding. Trout denounces understanding as irrelevant, if not dangerous, from an epistemic perspective and he endorses a radically objectivist view of explanation instead. In this note...

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Published in:Philosophy of science 2004-01, Vol.71 (1), p.98-109
Main Author: de Regt, Henk W.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognitive psychology
Criticism
Empiricism
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Explanation
Hindsight bias
Knowledge
Objectivity
Phenomena
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Physics
Pragmatism
Reality
Relevant alternatives
Science
Sensory perception
Truth
Visual perception
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description J.D. Trout (2002) presents a challenge to all theorists of scientific explanation who appeal to the notion of understanding. Trout denounces understanding as irrelevant, if not dangerous, from an epistemic perspective and he endorses a radically objectivist view of explanation instead. In this note I accept Trout's challenge. I criticize his argument and defend a non‐objectivist, pragmatic conception of understanding that is epistemically relevant.
doi_str_mv 10.1086/381415
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Cambridge Journals Online; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection
subjects Cognitive psychology
Criticism
Empiricism
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Explanation
Hindsight bias
Knowledge
Objectivity
Phenomena
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Physics
Pragmatism
Reality
Relevant alternatives
Science
Sensory perception
Truth
Visual perception
title Discussion Note: Making Sense of Understanding
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