Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy

The no‐miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much‐discussed in the psycho...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 2004-07, Vol.71 (3), p.320-338
Main Authors: Magnus, P. D., Callender, Craig
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Base interest rates
Credibility
Debate
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
False positive errors
History of science
Inference
Intuition
Mathematical realism
Philosophical realism
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Probability
Realism
Science
Underdetermination
Wholesale trade
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Summary:The no‐miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much‐discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent ‘wholesale’ arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists and anti‐realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling ofennuiafflicting contemporary philosophy of science.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/421536