Loading…
Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game
Conservation easements allow landowners to collect earnings from their land, while reducing their tax burdens because the land cannot be sold into development. Conservation assures open space amenities for nearby residents, however, the residents bear a tax increase that offsets the owner's tax...
Saved in:
| Published in: | Land economics 2004-08, Vol.80 (3), p.355-374 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Citations: | Items that cite this one |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c403t-7790532fb3ab3d95b1969ca80cbedf85e4b1e346d0cb62a3e0e9169b5aedadba3 |
|---|---|
| cites | |
| container_end_page | 374 |
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 355 |
| container_title | Land economics |
| container_volume | 80 |
| creator | Anderson, Christopher M. King, Jonathan R. |
| description | Conservation easements allow landowners to collect earnings from their land, while reducing their tax burdens because the land cannot be sold into development. Conservation assures open space amenities for nearby residents, however, the residents bear a tax increase that offsets the owner's tax reduction. We develop a gametheoretic model of the private monetary incentives induced by conservation easement programs, and use an experiment to verify that conservation decisions are made based on private incentives and without consideration of the public goods conservation provides. This implies that, unless land trusts are discriminating, conservation easements need not lead to optimal conservation, and may even reduce social welfare. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/3654726 |
| format | article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37962607</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>3654726</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>3654726</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c403t-7790532fb3ab3d95b1969ca80cbedf85e4b1e346d0cb62a3e0e9169b5aedadba3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqF0E1LAzEQBuAgCtYq_oVFRE-rSWaTNEct9QMKXvQckt1ZmrK7aZPdgv_eLe1JEOcyMDy8MC8h14w-cKDqEaQoFJcnZMJEAfkMuDglE0o55EqCPicXKa3pOEqqCZGL7eAb76If2uwZV3bnQ8x8l_UrzOahSxh3tvehyxY2YYtdn73aFi_JWW2bhFfHPSVfL4vP-Vu-_Hh9nz8t87Kg0OdKaSqA1w6sg0oLx7TUpZ3R0mFVzwQWjiEUshoPkltAippJ7YTFylbOwpTcHXI3MWwHTL1pfSqxaWyHYUgGlJZcUvUvZAo4KClHePMLrsMQu_EJw6lUAELt0-4PqIwhpYi12UTf2vhtGDX7ls2x5VHeHuQ69SH-yX4A-LR4qg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>206733577</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game</title><source>EconLit s plnými texty</source><source>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</source><source>Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】</source><source>JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection</source><creator>Anderson, Christopher M. ; King, Jonathan R.</creator><creatorcontrib>Anderson, Christopher M. ; King, Jonathan R.</creatorcontrib><description>Conservation easements allow landowners to collect earnings from their land, while reducing their tax burdens because the land cannot be sold into development. Conservation assures open space amenities for nearby residents, however, the residents bear a tax increase that offsets the owner's tax reduction. We develop a gametheoretic model of the private monetary incentives induced by conservation easement programs, and use an experiment to verify that conservation decisions are made based on private incentives and without consideration of the public goods conservation provides. This implies that, unless land trusts are discriminating, conservation easements need not lead to optimal conservation, and may even reduce social welfare.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0023-7639</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1543-8325</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2307/3654726</identifier><identifier>CODEN: LAECAD</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Madison: University of Wisconsin Press</publisher><subject>Conservation ; Conservation easements ; Easements ; Environment ; Equilibrium ; Game theory ; Income taxes ; Land conservation ; Land development ; Land economics ; Land trusts ; Land use ; Landowners ; Nash equilibrium ; Property taxes ; Public goods ; Social welfare ; Studies ; Tax incentives ; Tax increases</subject><ispartof>Land economics, 2004-08, Vol.80 (3), p.355-374</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2004 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System</rights><rights>Copyright University of Wisconsin Press Aug 2004</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c403t-7790532fb3ab3d95b1969ca80cbedf85e4b1e346d0cb62a3e0e9169b5aedadba3</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3654726$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3654726$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27923,27924,33222,33223,58237,58470</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Anderson, Christopher M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>King, Jonathan R.</creatorcontrib><title>Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game</title><title>Land economics</title><description>Conservation easements allow landowners to collect earnings from their land, while reducing their tax burdens because the land cannot be sold into development. Conservation assures open space amenities for nearby residents, however, the residents bear a tax increase that offsets the owner's tax reduction. We develop a gametheoretic model of the private monetary incentives induced by conservation easement programs, and use an experiment to verify that conservation decisions are made based on private incentives and without consideration of the public goods conservation provides. This implies that, unless land trusts are discriminating, conservation easements need not lead to optimal conservation, and may even reduce social welfare.</description><subject>Conservation</subject><subject>Conservation easements</subject><subject>Easements</subject><subject>Environment</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Income taxes</subject><subject>Land conservation</subject><subject>Land development</subject><subject>Land economics</subject><subject>Land trusts</subject><subject>Land use</subject><subject>Landowners</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Property taxes</subject><subject>Public goods</subject><subject>Social welfare</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tax incentives</subject><subject>Tax increases</subject><issn>0023-7639</issn><issn>1543-8325</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2004</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNqF0E1LAzEQBuAgCtYq_oVFRE-rSWaTNEct9QMKXvQckt1ZmrK7aZPdgv_eLe1JEOcyMDy8MC8h14w-cKDqEaQoFJcnZMJEAfkMuDglE0o55EqCPicXKa3pOEqqCZGL7eAb76If2uwZV3bnQ8x8l_UrzOahSxh3tvehyxY2YYtdn73aFi_JWW2bhFfHPSVfL4vP-Vu-_Hh9nz8t87Kg0OdKaSqA1w6sg0oLx7TUpZ3R0mFVzwQWjiEUshoPkltAippJ7YTFylbOwpTcHXI3MWwHTL1pfSqxaWyHYUgGlJZcUvUvZAo4KClHePMLrsMQu_EJw6lUAELt0-4PqIwhpYi12UTf2vhtGDX7ls2x5VHeHuQ69SH-yX4A-LR4qg</recordid><startdate>20040801</startdate><enddate>20040801</enddate><creator>Anderson, Christopher M.</creator><creator>King, Jonathan R.</creator><general>University of Wisconsin Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7ST</scope><scope>7U6</scope><scope>C1K</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20040801</creationdate><title>Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game</title><author>Anderson, Christopher M. ; King, Jonathan R.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c403t-7790532fb3ab3d95b1969ca80cbedf85e4b1e346d0cb62a3e0e9169b5aedadba3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2004</creationdate><topic>Conservation</topic><topic>Conservation easements</topic><topic>Easements</topic><topic>Environment</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Income taxes</topic><topic>Land conservation</topic><topic>Land development</topic><topic>Land economics</topic><topic>Land trusts</topic><topic>Land use</topic><topic>Landowners</topic><topic>Nash equilibrium</topic><topic>Property taxes</topic><topic>Public goods</topic><topic>Social welfare</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Tax incentives</topic><topic>Tax increases</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Anderson, Christopher M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>King, Jonathan R.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Environment Abstracts</collection><collection>Sustainability Science Abstracts</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><jtitle>Land economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Anderson, Christopher M.</au><au>King, Jonathan R.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game</atitle><jtitle>Land economics</jtitle><date>2004-08-01</date><risdate>2004</risdate><volume>80</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>355</spage><epage>374</epage><pages>355-374</pages><issn>0023-7639</issn><eissn>1543-8325</eissn><coden>LAECAD</coden><abstract>Conservation easements allow landowners to collect earnings from their land, while reducing their tax burdens because the land cannot be sold into development. Conservation assures open space amenities for nearby residents, however, the residents bear a tax increase that offsets the owner's tax reduction. We develop a gametheoretic model of the private monetary incentives induced by conservation easement programs, and use an experiment to verify that conservation decisions are made based on private incentives and without consideration of the public goods conservation provides. This implies that, unless land trusts are discriminating, conservation easements need not lead to optimal conservation, and may even reduce social welfare.</abstract><cop>Madison</cop><pub>University of Wisconsin Press</pub><doi>10.2307/3654726</doi><tpages>20</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0023-7639 |
| ispartof | Land economics, 2004-08, Vol.80 (3), p.355-374 |
| issn | 0023-7639 1543-8325 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37962607 |
| source | EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection |
| subjects | Conservation Conservation easements Easements Environment Equilibrium Game theory Income taxes Land conservation Land development Land economics Land trusts Land use Landowners Nash equilibrium Property taxes Public goods Social welfare Studies Tax incentives Tax increases |
| title | Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game |
| url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-09T03%3A52%3A29IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Equilibrium%20Behavior%20in%20the%20Conservation%20Easement%20Game&rft.jtitle=Land%20economics&rft.au=Anderson,%20Christopher%20M.&rft.date=2004-08-01&rft.volume=80&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=355&rft.epage=374&rft.pages=355-374&rft.issn=0023-7639&rft.eissn=1543-8325&rft.coden=LAECAD&rft_id=info:doi/10.2307/3654726&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E3654726%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c403t-7790532fb3ab3d95b1969ca80cbedf85e4b1e346d0cb62a3e0e9169b5aedadba3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=206733577&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=3654726&rfr_iscdi=true |