When do firms hire lobbyists? The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission

This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Industrial and corporate change 2004-12, Vol.13 (6), p.883-900
Main Authors: de Figueiredo, John M., Kim, James J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Compensation
Competitive advantage
Costs
Employees
Equity participations
Government agencies
Lobbying
Lobbyists
Organization theory
Pay telephones
Studies
Tactics
Vertical integration
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Summary:This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC.
ISSN:0960-6491
1464-3650
1464-3650
DOI:10.1093/icc/dth035