Achieving the Optimal Power of Patent Rights

In order to encourage investment into the creation of an asset, capitalism extends to firms and individuals the right to appropriate the returns from owning that asset. This article examines how policy instruments governing the grant and enforcement of one type of intellectual property right - paten...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Australian economic history review 2004-12, Vol.37 (4), p.419-426
Main Authors: Jensen, Paul H., Webster, Elizabeth
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Competition
Disputes
Economics
Enforcement
Intellectual property
Inventions
Inventors
Investments
Legal aspects
Property rights
Public policy
Studies
Uncertainty
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Description
Summary:In order to encourage investment into the creation of an asset, capitalism extends to firms and individuals the right to appropriate the returns from owning that asset. This article examines how policy instruments governing the grant and enforcement of one type of intellectual property right - patents - affect the ex ante incentive to invest in inventive activity. The three policy instruments are the size of the inventive step required to pass the patent examination, the quality of patent examination and the predisposition of the courts to affirm the patent office's decision.
ISSN:0004-9018
1467-8462
2832-157X
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8462.2004.00343.x