Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets

Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocate...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European economic review 2005-04, Vol.49 (3), p.659-681
Main Authors: Brusco, Sandro, Panunzi, Fausto
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Allocations
Capital market
Conglomerates
Corporate finance
Diversification
Economic models
Economics
Enterprises
Incentives
Internal capital markets
Lobbying
Management
Managerial incentives
Studies
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Summary:Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post. When managers derive utility from the funds under their purview, moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives. The ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds. This effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives. Moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount.
ISSN:0014-2921
1873-572X
DOI:10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00066-7