Subjective reasoning—solutions

The subjective framework is used to characterize the reasoning leading to an equilibrium refinement based on sequential rationality and Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. Equilibria based on sequential rationality require different reasoning on and off the equilibrium path for such solutions to emer...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2005-07, Vol.52 (1), p.94-132
Main Author: Feinberg, Yossi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognition & reasoning
Epistemology
Equilibrium
Game theory
Games of strategy
Human behaviour
Mathematical methods
Mathematical models
Microeconomics
Rationality
Reasoning
Studies
Subjectivity
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The subjective framework is used to characterize the reasoning leading to an equilibrium refinement based on sequential rationality and Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. Equilibria based on sequential rationality require different reasoning on and off the equilibrium path for such solutions to emerge, or need arbitrary rules for reasoning depending on which game is played. We suggest a solution concept termed the “reasonable solution” based on maximization of confidence in rationality, equal treatment of the reasoning procedure at every decision point, confidence of this symmetry in the method of reasoning about others, and the use of the same reasoning principle by the modeler and the players. While not an equilibrium refinement, this concept generalizes the backward induction solution.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.004