Bargaining power of landlords and underdevelopment in a system of cities

.  We consider two models of a system of cities in which landlords have some power in negotiating rental prices at which land is rented to develop cities. Analysis shows that the equilibrium city size is smaller than the optimal city size in a model in which city sizes are controlled by development...

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Published in:Papers in regional science 2005-06, Vol.84 (2), p.239-250
Main Author: Sato, Yasuhiro
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
C78
Cities
City size
Housing
Local government
R13
Regional studies
Rent
Statistical analysis
Underdevelopment
Urban studies
Urban system
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description .  We consider two models of a system of cities in which landlords have some power in negotiating rental prices at which land is rented to develop cities. Analysis shows that the equilibrium city size is smaller than the optimal city size in a model in which city sizes are controlled by development companies or by local governments. Furthermore, it is shown that the equilibrium city size tends to be either smaller or larger than the optimal city size in a model in which city sizes are not controlled. These results confirm the possibility of underdevelopment of cities.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/j.1435-5957.2005.00015.x
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source EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect®; BSC - Ebsco (Business Source Ultimate)
subjects Bargaining
C78
Cities
City size
Housing
Local government
R13
Regional studies
Rent
Statistical analysis
Underdevelopment
Urban studies
Urban system
title Bargaining power of landlords and underdevelopment in a system of cities
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