Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm

Over the past 25 years, many papers have examined what determines the boundaries of the firm. Empirical work has been generally supportive that firms integrate to avoid appropriation problems that arise when assets are specific. Empirical work in newer branches of contract economies has begun to eme...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review 2001-05, Vol.91 (2), p.189-194
Main Authors: Baker, George P., Hubbard, Thomas N.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Assets
Behavior
Boundaries
Contract incentives
Contract method
Contracts
Economic externalities
Economic models
Economic theory
Externalities
Externality
Firm theory
Incentives
Observational research
Ownership
Ownership incentives
Ownership rights
Researchers
Studies
The Scope of the Firm: New Empirical Directions
Truck drivers
Trucking
Trucking industry
Trucks
Vehicle fleets
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Over the past 25 years, many papers have examined what determines the boundaries of the firm. Empirical work has been generally supportive that firms integrate to avoid appropriation problems that arise when assets are specific. Empirical work in newer branches of contract economies has begun to emerge. This paper discusses empirical strategies for examining some of the recent theoretical work on firms' boundaries. The importance of testing theories' general propositions rather than specific models, the returns from field work in linking conceptual and institutional detail, and the promise of empirical strategies that rely on variation in the contracting environment are discussed.
ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.91.2.189