Majoritarian Management of the Commons

This article analyzes usage of a common property resource, “the commons,” under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements. Particular emphasis is on majority decision rules. When separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic inquiry 2001-07, Vol.39 (3), p.396-405
Main Authors: Buchanan, James M., Yoon, Yong J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Collectivization
Common stock
Data analysis
Decision making
Duopoly
Economic aspects
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Efficiency
Equilibrium
Evaluation
Externality
Fisheries
Fishing industry
Game theory
Government property
Government spending
Majority rule
Political economy
Political science
Politics
Privatization
Public goods
Resource exploitation
Studies
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Summary:This article analyzes usage of a common property resource, “the commons,” under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements. Particular emphasis is on majority decision rules. When separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common resource, total value is dissipated, but the interdependencies introduced by possible membership in differing coalitions to an extent reduce the incentives for exploitation. The formal analysis is analogous to that familiar in Cournot‐Nash duopoly‐oligopoly models but with differing efficiency implications. The argument has relevance for differential‐benefit public spending from general tax sources, as well as other applications.
ISSN:0095-2583
1465-7295
DOI:10.1093/ei/39.3.396