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Majoritarian Management of the Commons
This article analyzes usage of a common property resource, “the commons,” under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements. Particular emphasis is on majority decision rules. When separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common...
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| Published in: | Economic inquiry 2001-07, Vol.39 (3), p.396-405 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5386-f31580c82b5082bcffce2be5956fe06af08e8168d892c61d266d8e41b7adc1263 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5386-f31580c82b5082bcffce2be5956fe06af08e8168d892c61d266d8e41b7adc1263 |
| container_end_page | 405 |
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 396 |
| container_title | Economic inquiry |
| container_volume | 39 |
| creator | Buchanan, James M. Yoon, Yong J. |
| description | This article analyzes usage of a common property resource, “the commons,” under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements. Particular emphasis is on majority decision rules. When separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common resource, total value is dissipated, but the interdependencies introduced by possible membership in differing coalitions to an extent reduce the incentives for exploitation. The formal analysis is analogous to that familiar in Cournot‐Nash duopoly‐oligopoly models but with differing efficiency implications. The argument has relevance for differential‐benefit public spending from general tax sources, as well as other applications. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/ei/39.3.396 |
| format | article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0095-2583 |
| ispartof | Economic inquiry, 2001-07, Vol.39 (3), p.396-405 |
| issn | 0095-2583 1465-7295 |
| language | eng |
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| source | EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Wiley; ABI/INFORM Global; Social Science Premium Collection (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3) |
| subjects | Collectivization Common stock Data analysis Decision making Duopoly Economic aspects Economic models Economic theory Economics Efficiency Equilibrium Evaluation Externality Fisheries Fishing industry Game theory Government property Government spending Majority rule Political economy Political science Politics Privatization Public goods Resource exploitation Studies |
| title | Majoritarian Management of the Commons |
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