Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets

It is shown that Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets need not converge in replica sequences of economies, no matter how nice the preferences may be. The measure of the set of individually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatment (IRPOET) allocations which are not in the Mas-Collel and Zhou bargaining...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Econometrica 1997-09, Vol.65 (5), p.1227-1239
Main Authors: Anderson, Robert M., Trockel, Walter, Zhou, Lin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Bargaining
Bargaining theory
Econometrics
Economic agents
Economic competition
Economic theory
Economic utility
Exact sciences and technology
Game theory
Health care economics
Hypotheses
Integers
Notes and Comments
Operational research and scientific management
Operational research. Management science
Pareto efficiency
Perceptron convergence procedure
Portfolio theory
Studies
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Summary:It is shown that Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets need not converge in replica sequences of economies, no matter how nice the preferences may be. The measure of the set of individually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatment (IRPOET) allocations which are not in the Mas-Collel and Zhou bargaining sets tends to zero as the economy is replicated; in particular, the set of IRPOET bargaining set allocations converges in the Hausdorff distance to the set of all IRPOET allocations.
ISSN:0012-9682
1468-0262
DOI:10.2307/2171887