Discrimination and job-uncertainty

In this paper I incorporate group behaviour into a model of the labour market and show that discrimination can be the result of competition between coalitions of workers and bosses for jobs. If the probability of correctly assessing the productivity of individual workers decreases, coalition-formati...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 1998-09, Vol.36 (4), p.433-446
Main Author: Frijters, P.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Co-operation
Discrimination
Economic theory
Employment security
Games
Group behaviour
Job security
Job uncertainty
Labour market
Noncooperative stochastic games
Productivity
Social conflict
Social conflicts
Stochastic models
Stochastic processes
Studies
Uncertainty
Unemployment
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Summary:In this paper I incorporate group behaviour into a model of the labour market and show that discrimination can be the result of competition between coalitions of workers and bosses for jobs. If the probability of correctly assessing the productivity of individual workers decreases, coalition-formation on the basis of recognisable characteristics becomes relatively more rewarding than coalition forming on the basis of productivity. The conditions are under which each individual in the endogeneously defined group actively discriminates persons with different recognisable characteristics, independent of productivity.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00104-8