Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game

This paper describes the experimental results of a dynamic voting game. Subjects are induced with common preferences, but have asymmetric and incomplete information about the payoff-generating behavior of two available proposals. The election process serves as a mechanism to gather the dispersed inf...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 1999-01, Vol.26 (1), p.131-156
Main Author: Wit, Jörgen
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aggregate analysis
Asymmetric information
Decision making
Experiments
Game theory
Information acquisition
Pay-off
Social welfare
Voting behaviour
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Summary:This paper describes the experimental results of a dynamic voting game. Subjects are induced with common preferences, but have asymmetric and incomplete information about the payoff-generating behavior of two available proposals. The election process serves as a mechanism to gather the dispersed information. It is shown that subjects are more effective in coordinating their decisions to a socially optimal equilibrium when they get more experienced. The way they succeed in doing this is by paying less attention to the popularity of a proposal.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D72, D82.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1006/game.1998.0634