Strategic behavior and the problem of storming in a centrally planned economy

It is shown that if the common knowledge assumption is properly utilized, then it is possible to dispose of some unnecessary restrictions on the game-theoretic account of storming presented by Alexeev.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic behavior & organization 1994-09, Vol.25 (1), p.135-138
Main Author: Gekker, Ruvin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic reform
Economic theory
Game theory
Planned economy
Production
Productivity
Studies
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Description
Summary:It is shown that if the common knowledge assumption is properly utilized, then it is possible to dispose of some unnecessary restrictions on the game-theoretic account of storming presented by Alexeev.
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90091-4