More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures

This article applies psychological game theory to study the maintenance of social order. It models the control of corruption in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. The models possess multiple equilibria, which correspond to certain social norms and organizational cultures or their absence. The...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of law, economics, & organization economics, & organization, 1994-10, Vol.10 (2), p.390-406
Main Authors: Huang, Peter H, Wu, Ho-Mou
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Culture
Economic expectations
Economic theory
Emotional expression
Game theory
Guilt
Nash equilibrium
Organization
Organizational culture
Psychology
Social norms
Social psychology
Citations: Items that cite this one
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Summary:This article applies psychological game theory to study the maintenance of social order. It models the control of corruption in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. The models possess multiple equilibria, which correspond to certain social norms and organizational cultures or their absence. The models demonstrate how expectations concerning the likelihood of corrupt behavior can influence decisions to engage in such behavior via the magnitude of endogenous remorse on the part of the actor.
ISSN:8756-6222
1465-7341
1465-7341
DOI:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036856