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Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery
The paper compares four methods of rent capture in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas using simulations from a unit profit function. Some theoretical properties of a quota rental charge, profit charge, lump sum charge, and an ad valorem royalty are examined and then compared in si...
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Published in: | Journal of environmental economics and management 1995, Vol.28 (1), p.48-67 |
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container_title | Journal of environmental economics and management |
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creator | Grafton, R.Quentin |
description | The paper compares four methods of rent capture in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas using simulations from a unit profit function. Some theoretical properties of a quota rental charge, profit charge, lump sum charge, and an
ad valorem royalty are examined and then compared in simulations in terms of the distribution of profits, distortions to the fishery, the relative burden on fishers, and flexibility to adjust to changes in the fishery. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1006/jeem.1995.1004 |
format | article |
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ispartof | Journal of environmental economics and management, 1995, Vol.28 (1), p.48-67 |
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language | eng |
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source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Elsevier |
subjects | ADMINISTRACION PESQUERA ALQUILERES ANOPLOPOMA Anoplopoma fimbria Comparative studies COSTOS COUT ECONOMETRIA ECONOMETRIE Economics Environmental economics Estimating techniques Fish hatcheries Fisheries GESTION DES PECHES LOYER Lump sum Marine Methods Refuse as fuel REGULACION DE LA PRODUCCION REGULATION DE LA PRODUCTION Rent Rent control Resource management Simulation Statistical analysis |
title | Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery |
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