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Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery

The paper compares four methods of rent capture in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas using simulations from a unit profit function. Some theoretical properties of a quota rental charge, profit charge, lump sum charge, and an ad valorem royalty are examined and then compared in si...

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Published in:Journal of environmental economics and management 1995, Vol.28 (1), p.48-67
Main Author: Grafton, R.Quentin
Format: Article
Language:English
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description The paper compares four methods of rent capture in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas using simulations from a unit profit function. Some theoretical properties of a quota rental charge, profit charge, lump sum charge, and an ad valorem royalty are examined and then compared in simulations in terms of the distribution of profits, distortions to the fishery, the relative burden on fishers, and flexibility to adjust to changes in the fishery.
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identifier ISSN: 0095-0696
ispartof Journal of environmental economics and management, 1995, Vol.28 (1), p.48-67
issn 0095-0696
1096-0449
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38712555
source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Elsevier
subjects ADMINISTRACION PESQUERA
ALQUILERES
ANOPLOPOMA
Anoplopoma fimbria
Comparative studies
COSTOS
COUT
ECONOMETRIA
ECONOMETRIE
Economics
Environmental economics
Estimating techniques
Fish hatcheries
Fisheries
GESTION DES PECHES
LOYER
Lump sum
Marine
Methods
Refuse as fuel
REGULACION DE LA PRODUCCION
REGULATION DE LA PRODUCTION
Rent
Rent control
Resource management
Simulation
Statistical analysis
title Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery
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