Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

This paper provides an elementary, non‐technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcomi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic surveys 1999-07, Vol.13 (3), p.227-286
Main Author: Klemperer, Paul
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Auction Theory
Auctions
Bidding
Common-value Auctions
Mechanism Design
Private-value Auctions
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Summary:This paper provides an elementary, non‐technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.); We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk‐aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi‐unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section.
ISSN:0950-0804
1467-6419
DOI:10.1111/1467-6419.00083