A Note on Matsushima's Regularity Condition

This note first uses a simple example to show that H. Matsushima's (1991, J. Econ. Theory54, 198–203) regularity condition, to the contrary of his claim, actually does not imply C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gérard-Varet's (1979, J. Public Econ.11, 25–45) compatibility condition. It then p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic theory 1999-08, Vol.87 (2), p.429-433
Main Author: Chung, Kim-Sau
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Decision theory
Economic theory
Imperfect information
Mathematical economics
Public choice
Studies
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Summary:This note first uses a simple example to show that H. Matsushima's (1991, J. Econ. Theory54, 198–203) regularity condition, to the contrary of his claim, actually does not imply C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gérard-Varet's (1979, J. Public Econ.11, 25–45) compatibility condition. It then proves a stronger version of Matsushima's proposition, namely that efficient public decision rules can be truthfully implemented with budget-balancing mechanisms under the weak regularity condition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1006/jeth.1999.2545