Compliance in the fishery protection zone around Svalbard

The 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard was established by the Norwegian government in 1977 and has been an issue of international dispute ever since. The disagreement is rooted in different interpretations of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty and has led Norway to choose a gentle enforcement of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ocean development and international law 1998-10, Vol.29 (4), p.339-360
Main Author: Honneland, Geir
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Barents sea
Compliance
Conflicts
Conservation
enforcement
Environmental policy
Fish industry
Fisheries
Fishermen
fishery control
Fishery management
Fishery protection
Fishing rights
Fishing zones
International agreements
International conflicts
International law
Legitimacy
Marine
Marine resources
Maritime borders
Maritime law
Norway
Protection
Regulation
Russia (Federative Republic)
Svalbard
the Barents Sea
Treaties
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Summary:The 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard was established by the Norwegian government in 1977 and has been an issue of international dispute ever since. The disagreement is rooted in different interpretations of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty and has led Norway to choose a gentle enforcement of fishery regulations in the area. In practice, this has implied that violators in the Svalbard Zone are not punished. Violation statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard nevertheless reveal a high degree of compliance by fishermen. The main question of the present article is how this compliance can be explained. It is apparently problematic to account for it through a traditional coercion-based approach since the threat of sanctions is absent. It is suggested that actual compliance is the result of such various factors as legitimacy, discursive measures, "indirect coercion"; or "creeping compliance,"; diplomatic negotiations, and sometimes also a lack of incentive on the part of fishermen to violate the rules.
ISSN:0090-8320
1521-0642
DOI:10.1080/00908329809546131