Cournot and Stackelberg Duopolies Revisited

First, conditions are derived for a leader (or a follower) to be more advantageous than a follower (or a leader) in Stackelberg duopoly with symmetric firms and without product differentiation. Second, the equilibria in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies are compared under a set of reasonable assumpt...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Japanese economic review (Oxford, England) England), 1999-09, Vol.50 (3), p.363-367
Main Author: Okuguchi, Koji
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Competition
Duopoly
Market structure
Pricing
Profit
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Summary:First, conditions are derived for a leader (or a follower) to be more advantageous than a follower (or a leader) in Stackelberg duopoly with symmetric firms and without product differentiation. Second, the equilibria in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies are compared under a set of reasonable assumptions. If the reaction function slopes upward, the Cournot duopolists' profits turn out to be lower than those of both the Stackelberg leader and follower, and the equilibrium industry output is smaller in Stackelberg duopoly than in Cournot duopoly. JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D43, L13.
ISSN:1352-4739
1468-5876
DOI:10.1111/1468-5876.00125