On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games

A substantial generalization of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results for the usual continuum game model is obtained by the introduction of a new feeble topology on the set of action profiles. This allows for very general action spaces and no longer presupposes integrability of the action profi...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of mathematical economics 1999-10, Vol.32 (2), p.207-223
Main Author: Balder, Erik J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic models
Equilibrium
Equilibrium models
Feeble topology
Game theory
Mathematical analysis
Mathematical economics
Mathematical models
Microeconomics
Mixed and pure Cournot–Nash equilibria
Narrow topology
Studies
Topology
Young measures
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:A substantial generalization of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results for the usual continuum game model is obtained by the introduction of a new feeble topology on the set of action profiles. This allows for very general action spaces and no longer presupposes integrability of the action profiles. As a consequence of this generality, mixed equilibrium existence in the model not only implies pure equilibrium existence, but also follows from it.
ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00041-X