Regulating nonpoint source pollution under heterogeneous conditions

Because of difficulties in measuring effluent from nonpoint pollution, proposals for regulating agricultural runoff often suggest instruments applied to inputs or management practices. When pollution functions vary across sources, uniform input instruments cannot achieve a least-cost pollution reduc...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of agricultural economics 1995-11, Vol.77 (4), p.1024-1032
Main Authors: Helfand, G.E. (University of California, Davis.), House, B.W
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agricultural economics
Agricultural management
Agricultural pollution
Agricultural production
Agricultural soils
CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIE
CONTROL DE LA CONTAMINACION
COSTOS SOCIALES
Costs
COUT SOCIAL
Effluents
Environmental policy
Farmers
Fertilizers
FONCTION DE PRODUCTION
FUNCIONES DE LA PRODUCCION
IMPOT
IMPUESTOS
Incentives
input instruments
LAITUE
LECHUGAS
Lettuce
lettuce production
LUTTE ANTIPOLLUTION
NITRATE
nitrate pollution
Nitrates
NITRATOS
Nitrogen
Nonpoint source pollution
Pollution
Pollution control
pollution restrictions
Prices
PRODUCCION VEGETAL
PRODUCTION VEGETALE
PROTECCION AMBIENTAL
PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT
Q240
Q250
REGLAMENTACIONES
REGLEMENTATION
Regulation
Single tax system
Soil pollution
Soil water
Taxation
Taxes
U.S.A
Vegetables
Water pollution
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Description
Summary:Because of difficulties in measuring effluent from nonpoint pollution, proposals for regulating agricultural runoff often suggest instruments applied to inputs or management practices. When pollution functions vary across sources, uniform input instruments cannot achieve a least-cost pollution reduction, but efficient instruments may be difficult to administer. In this paper we analyze lettuce production on two soils in California's Salinas Valley to consider empirical costs associated with uniform input taxes and regulations. The results suggest that uniform instruments may not be costly relative to an efficient baseline. Though taxes are more efficient, farmers have higher profits with regulations.
ISSN:0002-9092
1467-8276
DOI:10.2307/1243825