The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions

In this article we study an example of a fishery in which there are two agents, each harvesting two species of fish. There are two externalities in the model: the dynamic externality studied in Levhari and Mirman (1980) and the biological externality examined in Fischer and Mirman (1992). This model...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of environmental economics and management 1996-01, Vol.30 (1), p.34-42
Main Authors: Fischer, Ronald D., Mirman, Leonard J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Competition
Economic models
Environmental economics
Fisheries
Fishery economics
fishes
Game theory
Harvesting
Mathematical models
modele
modelos
peces
poisson animal
Renewable resources
Studies
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Summary:In this article we study an example of a fishery in which there are two agents, each harvesting two species of fish. There are two externalities in the model: the dynamic externality studied in Levhari and Mirman (1980) and the biological externality examined in Fischer and Mirman (1992). This model allows us to study the interactions between agents in a model in which the species of fish interact. We find the unique closed loop Nash equilibrium in the context of a differential game and we compare the resulting catch ratios to the results of the earlier papers, which allow for only one externality. We also study the efficiency of the solution.
ISSN:0095-0696
1096-0449
DOI:10.1006/jeem.1996.0003