Loading…
Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes
Recently, nongovernmental organizations have engaged in debt-for-nature swaps in an effort to slow the rate of deforestation. The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of the welfare properties that arise to self-enforcing swaps. We show that swaps may be self-enforcing in that they can arise...
Saved in:
| Published in: | Ecological economics 1996-11, Vol.19 (2), p.135-146 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c495t-ba825aba0bb908bbde34005447db909faf79044ab350bba82058e9c52a7175fd3 |
|---|---|
| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c495t-ba825aba0bb908bbde34005447db909faf79044ab350bba82058e9c52a7175fd3 |
| container_end_page | 146 |
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 135 |
| container_title | Ecological economics |
| container_volume | 19 |
| creator | Chambers, Paul E. Jensen, Richard Whitehead, John C. |
| description | Recently, nongovernmental organizations have engaged in debt-for-nature swaps in an effort to slow the rate of deforestation. The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of the welfare properties that arise to self-enforcing swaps. We show that swaps may be self-enforcing in that they can arise as noncooperative equilibria at high harvest and debt levels. Under these conditions, a credit constrained LDC is likely to reduce harvest levels. Similarly if the NGO views preservation projects as complements, it is likely to provide debt relief. We provide simulations to demonstrate the effects of different parametric values for the utility functions of the LDC and NGO on the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/0921-8009(96)00032-8 |
| format | article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38929077</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>0921800996000328</els_id><sourcerecordid>38929077</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c495t-ba825aba0bb908bbde34005447db909faf79044ab350bba82058e9c52a7175fd3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkEtLxDAUhYMoOI7-AxddiS6qN03TJhtBxjcDbnQd0vQWK21Tk3Zk_r2plVlq4OZx-M4hHEJOKVxSoNkVyITGAkCey-wCAFgSiz2yoCJncUYh2yeLHXJIjrz_CFCWSbYgcIvFEFfWxZ0eRoeR_9K9j7SPOtsZa3t0eqg3GNlxMLZFf0wOKt14PPk9l-Tt_u519RivXx6eVjfr2KSSD3GhRcJ1oaEoJIiiKJGlADxN8zIIstJVLiFNdcF4QAIMXKA0PNE5zXlVsiU5m3N7Zz9H9INqa2-waXSHdvSKCZlIyPN_QRoaEExCANMZNM5677BSvatb7baKgpp6VFNJaipJyfCYelQi2J5nm8Mezc6DYRnbBGWjmKYybNufS7AyXYdJwvSTxLiiaabehzaEXc9hGKrb1OiUNzV2BsvaoRlUaeu_f_MNSoGR_Q</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>16108390</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes</title><source>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</source><source>ScienceDirect Journals</source><creator>Chambers, Paul E. ; Jensen, Richard ; Whitehead, John C.</creator><creatorcontrib>Chambers, Paul E. ; Jensen, Richard ; Whitehead, John C.</creatorcontrib><description>Recently, nongovernmental organizations have engaged in debt-for-nature swaps in an effort to slow the rate of deforestation. The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of the welfare properties that arise to self-enforcing swaps. We show that swaps may be self-enforcing in that they can arise as noncooperative equilibria at high harvest and debt levels. Under these conditions, a credit constrained LDC is likely to reduce harvest levels. Similarly if the NGO views preservation projects as complements, it is likely to provide debt relief. We provide simulations to demonstrate the effects of different parametric values for the utility functions of the LDC and NGO on the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0921-8009</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-6106</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/0921-8009(96)00032-8</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Conservation ; Debt ; Debt-for-nature swaps ; Deforestation ; Environmental degradation ; Environmental policy ; Forest fragmentation ; Game theory ; Non-governmental organizations ; South America</subject><ispartof>Ecological economics, 1996-11, Vol.19 (2), p.135-146</ispartof><rights>1996</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c495t-ba825aba0bb908bbde34005447db909faf79044ab350bba82058e9c52a7175fd3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c495t-ba825aba0bb908bbde34005447db909faf79044ab350bba82058e9c52a7175fd3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,33224</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeecolec/v_3a19_3ay_3a1996_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a135-146.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Chambers, Paul E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jensen, Richard</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Whitehead, John C.</creatorcontrib><title>Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes</title><title>Ecological economics</title><description>Recently, nongovernmental organizations have engaged in debt-for-nature swaps in an effort to slow the rate of deforestation. The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of the welfare properties that arise to self-enforcing swaps. We show that swaps may be self-enforcing in that they can arise as noncooperative equilibria at high harvest and debt levels. Under these conditions, a credit constrained LDC is likely to reduce harvest levels. Similarly if the NGO views preservation projects as complements, it is likely to provide debt relief. We provide simulations to demonstrate the effects of different parametric values for the utility functions of the LDC and NGO on the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria.</description><subject>Conservation</subject><subject>Debt</subject><subject>Debt-for-nature swaps</subject><subject>Deforestation</subject><subject>Environmental degradation</subject><subject>Environmental policy</subject><subject>Forest fragmentation</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Non-governmental organizations</subject><subject>South America</subject><issn>0921-8009</issn><issn>1873-6106</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1996</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkEtLxDAUhYMoOI7-AxddiS6qN03TJhtBxjcDbnQd0vQWK21Tk3Zk_r2plVlq4OZx-M4hHEJOKVxSoNkVyITGAkCey-wCAFgSiz2yoCJncUYh2yeLHXJIjrz_CFCWSbYgcIvFEFfWxZ0eRoeR_9K9j7SPOtsZa3t0eqg3GNlxMLZFf0wOKt14PPk9l-Tt_u519RivXx6eVjfr2KSSD3GhRcJ1oaEoJIiiKJGlADxN8zIIstJVLiFNdcF4QAIMXKA0PNE5zXlVsiU5m3N7Zz9H9INqa2-waXSHdvSKCZlIyPN_QRoaEExCANMZNM5677BSvatb7baKgpp6VFNJaipJyfCYelQi2J5nm8Mezc6DYRnbBGWjmKYybNufS7AyXYdJwvSTxLiiaabehzaEXc9hGKrb1OiUNzV2BsvaoRlUaeu_f_MNSoGR_Q</recordid><startdate>19961101</startdate><enddate>19961101</enddate><creator>Chambers, Paul E.</creator><creator>Jensen, Richard</creator><creator>Whitehead, John C.</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SN</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19961101</creationdate><title>Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes</title><author>Chambers, Paul E. ; Jensen, Richard ; Whitehead, John C.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c495t-ba825aba0bb908bbde34005447db909faf79044ab350bba82058e9c52a7175fd3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1996</creationdate><topic>Conservation</topic><topic>Debt</topic><topic>Debt-for-nature swaps</topic><topic>Deforestation</topic><topic>Environmental degradation</topic><topic>Environmental policy</topic><topic>Forest fragmentation</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Non-governmental organizations</topic><topic>South America</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Chambers, Paul E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Jensen, Richard</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Whitehead, John C.</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Ecology Abstracts</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Ecological economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Chambers, Paul E.</au><au>Jensen, Richard</au><au>Whitehead, John C.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes</atitle><jtitle>Ecological economics</jtitle><date>1996-11-01</date><risdate>1996</risdate><volume>19</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>135</spage><epage>146</epage><pages>135-146</pages><issn>0921-8009</issn><eissn>1873-6106</eissn><abstract>Recently, nongovernmental organizations have engaged in debt-for-nature swaps in an effort to slow the rate of deforestation. The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of the welfare properties that arise to self-enforcing swaps. We show that swaps may be self-enforcing in that they can arise as noncooperative equilibria at high harvest and debt levels. Under these conditions, a credit constrained LDC is likely to reduce harvest levels. Similarly if the NGO views preservation projects as complements, it is likely to provide debt relief. We provide simulations to demonstrate the effects of different parametric values for the utility functions of the LDC and NGO on the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria.</abstract><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/0921-8009(96)00032-8</doi><tpages>12</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0921-8009 |
| ispartof | Ecological economics, 1996-11, Vol.19 (2), p.135-146 |
| issn | 0921-8009 1873-6106 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38929077 |
| source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Conservation Debt Debt-for-nature swaps Deforestation Environmental degradation Environmental policy Forest fragmentation Game theory Non-governmental organizations South America |
| title | Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes |
| url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-05T20%3A01%3A51IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Debt-for-nature%20swaps%20as%20noncooperative%20outcomes&rft.jtitle=Ecological%20economics&rft.au=Chambers,%20Paul%20E.&rft.date=1996-11-01&rft.volume=19&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=135&rft.epage=146&rft.pages=135-146&rft.issn=0921-8009&rft.eissn=1873-6106&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/0921-8009(96)00032-8&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E38929077%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c495t-ba825aba0bb908bbde34005447db909faf79044ab350bba82058e9c52a7175fd3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=16108390&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |