Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program

Industry self-regulation has been proposed as a complement to government regulation. Proponents argue that the establishment of such structures may institutionalize environmental improvement, and critics suggest that without explicit sanctions, such structures will fall victim to opportunistic behav...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Academy of Management journal 2000-08, Vol.43 (4), p.698-716
Main Authors: King, Andrew A, Lenox, Michael J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Associations
Business management
Chemical industry
Codes
Collective action
Environment
Environmental impact
Environmental management
Environmental protection
Fines & penalties
Hypotheses
Initiatives
Manufacturers
Organizations
Prevention
Proposals
Regulation
Sanctions
Self regulation
Studies
U.S.A
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Summary:Industry self-regulation has been proposed as a complement to government regulation. Proponents argue that the establishment of such structures may institutionalize environmental improvement, and critics suggest that without explicit sanctions, such structures will fall victim to opportunistic behavior. In a study of the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible Care Program, it investigates the predictions of these 2 contradictory perspectives. Findings highlight the potential for opportunism to overcome the isomorphic pressures of even powerful self-regulatory institutions and suggest that effective industry self-regulation is difficult to maintain without explicit sanctions.
ISSN:0001-4273
0000-1427
1948-0989
DOI:10.5465/1556362