On the Theory of Negotiation

I. Introduction, 77. — II. Distinction between “bargaining” and “negotiation,” 78. — III. The choice theory model used in this analysis, 79. — IV. An explanation of why the parties negotiate at all, 82. — V. Analysis of the negotiation process itself, 85. — VI. An illustrative application of the mod...

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Published in:The Quarterly journal of economics 1958-02, Vol.72 (1), p.77-97
Main Author: Stevens, Carl M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Bargaining power
Business structures
Collective bargaining
Compromises
Cost estimates
Economic models
Game theory
Mediation
Negotiation
Rational choice theory
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container_title The Quarterly journal of economics
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creator Stevens, Carl M.
description I. Introduction, 77. — II. Distinction between “bargaining” and “negotiation,” 78. — III. The choice theory model used in this analysis, 79. — IV. An explanation of why the parties negotiate at all, 82. — V. Analysis of the negotiation process itself, 85. — VI. An illustrative application of the model, 87. — VII. Five analytically separable ways in which negotiation may terminate, 90. — VIII. Conclusion, 96.
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source JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Access via Business Source (EBSCOhost); PAIS Index; Oxford University Press:Jisc Collections:Oxford Journal Archive: Access period 2024-2025
subjects Bargaining
Bargaining power
Business structures
Collective bargaining
Compromises
Cost estimates
Economic models
Game theory
Mediation
Negotiation
Rational choice theory
title On the Theory of Negotiation
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