“Plata o Plomo?”: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence

We present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions gra...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American political science review 2006-02, Vol.100 (1), p.41-53
Main Authors: DAL BÓ, ERNESTO, DAL BÓ, PEDRO, DI TELLA, RAFAEL
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bribery
Campaign contributions
Coercion
Corruption
Corruption in government
Drugs
Government Employees
Government officials
Immunity
Institutions
Interest groups
Judicial corruption
Judicial system
Judiciary
Narcotics
Offenses
Political campaigns
Political corruption
Political influence
Political Influences
Political science
Political theory
Political violence
Politicians
Politics
Public life
Public officials
Punishment
Social responsibility
Terrorism
Violence
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high-ability citizens to enter public life. Cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians. This predicts that violence in a country will typically go together with corruption and worse politicians. Moreover, the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the influence game, so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials. Protecting officials from accusations of corruption (immunity) will decrease the frequency of corruption if the judiciary is weak and may increase the quality of politicians. These predictions cannot emerge from a traditional model where only bribes are used.
ISSN:0003-0554
1537-5943
DOI:10.1017/S0003055406061995