Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American political science review 2006-02, Vol.100 (1), p.85-97
Main Authors: IARYCZOWER, MATIAS, SPILLER, PABLO T., TOMMASI, MARIANO
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Campaign contributions
Constitutional law
Dictators
Electorate
Equilibrium
Federalism
Influence
Interest Groups
Judicial rulings
Judiciary
Judiciary power
Labor law
Labor Legislation
Labor strikes
Labour law
Legislative Bodies
Legislators
Legislatures
Lobbying
Political forces
Political interest groups
Political parties
Political science
Politicians
Politics
Public opinion
Separation of powers
Voters
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Summary:This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.
ISSN:0003-0554
1537-5943
DOI:10.1017/S0003055406062022