Strategic Interation in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises

The 1994 Cuban refugee crisis is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma game for Cuba & the United States. A threat power version of the theory of moves yields a cooperative outcome in the game, sustained by mutual threats that deter defections by each player, which is consistent with moves made b...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International interactions 2005-10, Vol.31 (4), p.327-348
Main Author: Zeager, Lester A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Crises
Cuba
Game Theory
Immigration Policy
Refugees
United States of America
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The 1994 Cuban refugee crisis is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma game for Cuba & the United States. A threat power version of the theory of moves yields a cooperative outcome in the game, sustained by mutual threats that deter defections by each player, which is consistent with moves made by the players. After the countries implemented deterrent threats, they agreed that Cuba would patrol its borders & the United States would admit 20,000 Cubans each year. We show that the analysis, suitably adapted, also illuminates strategic choices in the 1965 & 1980 Cuban refugee crises. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.
ISSN:0305-0629
DOI:10.1080/03050620500303399