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Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is...
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| Published in: | British journal of political science 2006-04, Vol.36 (2), p.193-212 |
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| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c551t-ad56219bb2f8a1e7296ddb716dfc56222e9f1b28dc69fbb156b3afbea274282c3 |
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| container_end_page | 212 |
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 193 |
| container_title | British journal of political science |
| container_volume | 36 |
| creator | GOLDER, SONA NADENICHEK |
| description | Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S0007123406000123 |
| format | article |
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| ispartof | British journal of political science, 2006-04, Vol.36 (2), p.193-212 |
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| source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; Politics Collection; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Cambridge University Press; ProQuest Social Science Premium Collection |
| subjects | Agreements Coalition bargaining Coalition governments Coalitions Comparative Analysis Confidence interval Data analysis Democracy Dyadic relations Elections Electoral behaviour Electoral systems Executive power Government Historical analysis Legislative Bodies Parliamentary regimes Parliamentary system Parliamentary Systems Party coalitions Political alliances Political Parties Political science Political theory Politics Standard deviation Voters Voting |
| title | Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies |
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