The People's Agent: Executive Branch Secrecy and Accountability in an Age of Terrorism

Shapiro and Steinzor apply the agency theory to the question of how much secrecy is too much. They use the theory to evaluate the impact of burgeoning secrecy in the likelihood that the executive branch officials will engage in faithful and forceful implementation of statutory materials, particularl...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Law and contemporary problems 2006-07, Vol.69 (3), p.99-129
Main Authors: Shapiro, Sidney A., Steinzor, Rena I.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Administrative agencies
Agency theory
Causality
Conflict of interests (Agency)
Corporations
Disclosure
Economic costs
Effectiveness
Executive branch
Freedom of information
Freedom of Information Act
Government
Incentives
Judicial Review
Knowledge
Laws, regulations and rules
Legislation
National security
Oversight
Public administration
Public health
Public policy
Public Sector
Science
Secrecy
Statutory law
Terrorism
Theory
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Description
Summary:Shapiro and Steinzor apply the agency theory to the question of how much secrecy is too much. They use the theory to evaluate the impact of burgeoning secrecy in the likelihood that the executive branch officials will engage in faithful and forceful implementation of statutory materials, particularly in the arenas of protecting public health, safety, and natural resources.
ISSN:0023-9186
1945-2322