Rational choice and von Neumann-Morgenstern's stable set: the case of path-dependent procedures

Describing a procedure in which choice proceeds in a sequence, we propose two alternative ways of resolving the decision problem whenever the outcome is sequence sensitive. One way yields a rationalizable choice set, and the other way produces a weakly rationalizable choice set that is equivalent to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2006-12, Vol.27 (3), p.611-619
Main Authors: Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, Sengupta, Kunal
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Axioms
Binary relations
Decision analysis
Decision Making
Economic theory
Game Theory
Mathematical functions
Path dependence
Rational choice theory
Studies
Voters
Voting Behavior
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Summary:Describing a procedure in which choice proceeds in a sequence, we propose two alternative ways of resolving the decision problem whenever the outcome is sequence sensitive. One way yields a rationalizable choice set, and the other way produces a weakly rationalizable choice set that is equivalent to von Neumann-Morgenstern's stable set. It is shown that for quasi-transitive rationalization, the maximal set must coincide with its stable set.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-006-0147-6