The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships: Why Rivals Do Not Overcome Suspicion Step by Step

Trusting relationships emerge when suspicious parties limit the consequences of exploitation. Governments will not transfer control over their interests to others if doing so creates a significant risk of domination by former rivals or loss of political office to internal opponents. These dangers ca...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political science quarterly 2007-06, Vol.122 (2), p.287-312
Main Author: HOFFMAN, AARON M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Case studies
Collectives
Community relations
Conflict management
Cooperation
Councils
Decision Making
Europe
European Community
European Community law
European Council
European history
European Union
Exploitation
Governance
Government
Government crises
International cooperation
International relations
Kidnapping
Methods
Peace process
Political action committees
Political alliances
Political science
Pressure
Treaties
Treaty of Rome
Trust
Voting
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Summary:Trusting relationships emerge when suspicious parties limit the consequences of exploitation. Governments will not transfer control over their interests to others if doing so creates a significant risk of domination by former rivals or loss of political office to internal opponents. These dangers can be reduced by designing institutions that guarantee potential trustors the ability to influence collective choices ("effective voice") and that enable leaders to make decisions without undermining their standing among their supporters ("breathing space"). Here, Hoffman examines the plausibility of the aforestated argument through a case study of governance in the European Community (EC), from the 1957 Treaty of Rome to the signing of the Single European Act in 1986. The study suggests a conclusion that successful trust-building strategies tackle the hardest issues first, through the provision of rules and procedures that enable actors to reliably influence and defend their core interests and that shield leaders from domestic political pressures.
ISSN:0032-3195
1538-165X
DOI:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00600.x