The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict

A formal model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of leadership turnover is analyzed where (1) successive leaders of the same state may differ in their resolve, (2) their resolve is private information, and (3) the probability of leadership turnover depends on bargaining behavior and conflict outcom...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of political science 2007-10, Vol.51 (4), p.772-788
Main Author: Wolford, Scott
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Antagonists
Armed conflict
Bargaining
Conflict
Conflict resolution
Conflict theory
Expected utility
Foreign policy
Government crises
Heads of state
Incumbents
Information
International conflicts
International Relations
International studies
Leadership
Measurement
Modeling
Negotiation
Political conflict
Political science
Protagonists
War
War conflict
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Summary:A formal model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of leadership turnover is analyzed where (1) successive leaders of the same state may differ in their resolve, (2) their resolve is private information, and (3) the probability of leadership turnover depends on bargaining behavior and conflict outcomes. The model provides novel answers to a number of questions about the relationship between an incumbent's time in office, the prospects of losing office, the anticipated behavior of future leaders, and the current probability of conflict. Taken together, these results add further weight to recent claims that leaders, not states, should be considered the fundamental units of analysis in international relations.
ISSN:0092-5853
1540-5907
DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00280.x