The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions

An established line of research demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We argue that the relationships between judges and other policy makers in se...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of political science 2008-07, Vol.52 (3), p.504-519
Main Authors: Staton, Jeffrey K., Vanberg, Georg
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Compliance costs
Court costs
Decision making
Decision theory
Delegation of authority
Game theory
Government bureaucracy
Guideline adherence
Judges
Judges & magistrates
Judicial review
Judicial rulings
Judiciary
Law
Legal norms
Legal systems
Legislators
Legislatures
Opinion
Opinions
Political science
Public policy
Social norms
Supreme Court
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Summary:An established line of research demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We argue that the relationships between judges and other policy makers in separation-of-powers systems are central to understanding this puzzle. Opinion vagueness can reflect efforts to resolve core tradeoffs associated with judicial policymaking that bear some resemblance to standard accounts of political delegation. Vagueness offers judges the ability to manage their uncertainty over policy outcomes and to hide likely defiance from public view. At the same time, vagueness removes a central source of pressure for compliance that judges can place on other policy makers. Using a game-theoretic model, we identify conditions under which judges use vagueness precisely as legislatures use statutory discretion. We also demonstrate conditions under which judges use vagueness in ways unanticipated by standard delegation accounts.
ISSN:0092-5853
1540-5907
DOI:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00326.x