Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM

Why have so few emissions markets been implemented? This article addresses this question by examining the political economy of the REgional Clean Air Market (RECLAIM) for Los Angeles. RECLAIM offers an excellent opportunity to study the political obstacles of emissions markets, because its nitrogen...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Natural resources journal 2000-07, Vol.40 (3), p.645-697
Main Author: THOMPSON, DALE B.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Air pollution
Air quality
California
Consumer goods
Economic incentives
Emissions
Emissions reduction
Emissions regulations
Emissions trading
Entrepreneurs
Environmental conditions
Environmental health
Environmental quality
Environmental technology
Gas
Greenhouse effect
Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California
Market orientation
Market regulation
Natural resources
Political conflicts
Political economy
Politics
Pollutant emissions
Pollution control in industry
Public choice
Public health
Regional Clean Air Market
Regulation
U.S.A
United States
Volatile organic compounds
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Summary:Why have so few emissions markets been implemented? This article addresses this question by examining the political economy of the REgional Clean Air Market (RECLAIM) for Los Angeles. RECLAIM offers an excellent opportunity to study the political obstacles of emissions markets, because its nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides component was implemented while its volatile organic compounds component was not. By carefully analyzing the decisions of the regulatory agency responsible for RECLAIM, this article offers a precise explanation of the political obstacles faced by an emissions market like RECLAIM. These obstacles include the difficulty in extending markets to sources and products that were previously unregulated under a command-and-control regime. Also, political conflict arising because of uncertainty is more contentious under emissions markets than under command-and-control regulation. This article then offers suggestions for improving the political feasibility of emissions markets.
ISSN:0028-0739
2640-2149