Different Goods, Different Effects: Exploring the Effects of Generalized Social Trust in Large-N Collective Action

Does generalized social trust help solve large-N collective action problems? This paper argues so, offering a novel explanation for the relationship: People tend to cooperate if they expect others to be cooperating, which implies that people holding generalized social trust more readily cooperate in...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2009-07, Vol.140 (1/2), p.145-160
Main Author: Sonderskov, Kim Mannemar
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavior
Collective Action
Control variables
Cooperation
Economics
Economics and Finance
Environment
Environmentalism
Food consumption
Hypotheses
Joint products
Organic foods
P values
Political Science
Price premiums
Public Finance
Public good
Public goods
Recycling
Reputations
Social evolution
Social research
Studies
Trust
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Summary:Does generalized social trust help solve large-N collective action problems? This paper argues so, offering a novel explanation for the relationship: People tend to cooperate if they expect others to be cooperating, which implies that people holding generalized social trust more readily cooperate in large-N dilemmas because they expect that most people will cooperate. The paper tests the explanation in a rigorous design. The analyses show a positive, robust effect of generalized social trust on public good provision, but no effect is found in a joint product situation. This supports the hypothesis, indicating that trust specifically enhances cooperation in collective action dilemmas.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-009-9416-0